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COMMENT
A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF PROTECTIVE




If an attorney walked by the offices of the American National Red
Cross1 (the "Red Cross") and saw a person slip and fall on the building's
icy steps, that lawyer would probably anticipate the personal injury law-
suit that would likely result. Personal injury suits are a staple business of
state civil courts. If asked whether this ordinary slip and fall case could
be heard in federal court, that lawyer would probably reply, "not with-
out diversity of citizenship." A recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court, however, would allow the Red Cross to remove this kind
of case from state to federal court, even without diversity.2 American
National Red Cross v. S. G.3 (Red Cross) raises this difficult and recurring
issue, often referred to as protective jurisdiction.
The term "protective jurisdiction" in this Comment will be used to
describe the extension of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction4 to cases
in which (1) there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties; (2)
the asserted claims are based on state law and state law provides the
substantive rules of decision; and (3) no substantial "federal question"
will be adjudicated.5 The Court yields to the extension of "arising
1. The American National Red Cross, 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1988) (as amended), was
organized by the United States government as this country's Red Cross Society pursuant
to the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and following. See The Geneva Convention of Au-
gust 22, 1864, For the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 Stat. 940
(1882); The Geneva Convention of July 6, 1906, For the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded of the Armies in the Field, 35 Stat. 1885 (1907); The Geneva Convention of
July 27, 1929, For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of
Armies in the Field, 47 Stat. 2074 (1932) [hereinafter collectively referred to as the Ge-
neva Treaties].
2. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
4. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III, § 2 provides that "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority"
(emphasis added).
5. The term "federal question" refers to an issue where the plaintiff's right to prevail
on a claim depends, at least in part, on an interpretation of federal or constitutional law;
in other words, on an issue "arising under" federal law. See Paul Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 157 n.6 (1953). The issue may
be raised in the plaintiff's complaint or asserted as an affirmative defense.
Professor Herbert Wechsler is credited as the first commentator to describe a theory of
protective jurisdiction. See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216, 224-25 (1948). Wechsler asserted that,
where Congress has the constitutional power to prescribe substantive rules of decision but
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under" jurisdiction in these types of cases because they contain a federal
ingredient.6
On June 19, 1992, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, de-
clared that all suits involving the Red Cross could be initially filed in, or
removed to, federal court.' The Court determined that language in the
Red Cross' congressional charter' vested federal courts with original ju-
risdiction over all cases involving the Red Cross.9 This decision raises
new questions, and resurrects some old concerns, about Congress' power
to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the "arising under"
clause of Article III of the United States Constitution. 10
On one level, Red Cross simply addresses the narrow issue of the ex-
tension of "arising under" jurisdiction to federally chartered corpora-
tions. Federal charter cases may be viewed as one component of
protective jurisdiction."I Protective jurisdiction also applies to a number
of different areas, including issues normally governed by state law.' 2
This Comment asserts, therefore, that Red Cross has broader implica-
tions. Unfortunately, the Red Cross Court studiously avoided the most
important issue-when Congress should be permitted to "expand"' 3 the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, it missed the opportunity to de-
velop a meaningful and workable theory of protective jurisdiction. The
chooses not to, it can, instead, enact a jurisdictional statute conferring federal court juris-
diction. See id. Professor Paul Mishkin appears to be the first commentator to coin the
phrase. See Mishkin, supra, at 186. For a discussion of the protective jurisdiction theo-
ries of Professors Wechsler and Mishkin, see infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
6. Since Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), it has
been axiomatic that as long as some part of a case potentially raises a federal question, the
extension of "arising under" jurisdiction is constitutional. This nascent federal question
is an "ingredient of the original cause." Id. at 823; see also infra notes 32-39 and accom-
panying text (discussing Osborn).
7. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2467 (1992).
8. See Act of Jan. 5, 1905, ch. 23, § 2, 33 Stat. 599 (1905) (codified as amended at 36
U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1988)).
9. See Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2472. The charter gives the Red Cross the power "to
sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of
the United States." The charter was amended in 1947 to add the phrase "State or Fed-
eral." See Act of May 8, 1947, ch. 50, 61 Stat. 80, 81 (1947). The Supreme Court deter-
mined that this key phrase conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts. See Red Cross,
112 S. Ct. at 2472.
10. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
11. See infra notes 108-43 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (federal
jurisdiction over suits between foreign citizens and foreign sovereigns); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal jurisdiction for cases involving col-
lective bargaining agreements normally governed by state law); Williams v. Austrian,
331 U.S. 642 (1947) (federal jurisdiction over suits by bankruptcy trustees normally gov-
erned by state law).
13. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see
also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850) ("The Constitution has defined the
limits of the judicial power of the United States .... "). Congress cannot literally expand




Court's simplistic approach, which it based on the mere fact of federal
incorporation and the language of the Red Cross' charter, 4 failed to take
into account whether there were sufficient federal interests at stake to
justify federal jurisdiction. This Comment argues that federal jurisdic-
tion may not be proper, even in the presence of a federal ingredient, un-
less a case implicates a meaningful federal interest.
There are over a hundred congressionally-chartered corporations in
existence today, many of which were organized to carry out the work of
various government agencies."5 Many of these corporations, however,
were not organized to engage in any government-related business. 6 Red
Cross seems to suggest that Congress could provide a federal forum for
cases involving these non-government corporations simply by amending
their charters to provide for federal court jurisdiction.' 7 According to
Red Cross, this extension of federal jurisdiction would be constitu-
tional:"8 The mere fact of federal incorporation places disputes involving
these corporations within the boundaries of the "arising under" jurisdic-
tion of Article III.9
Federal incorporation, however, should not fully explain the Supreme
Court's willingness to allow federal jurisdiction in Red Cross. Protective
jurisdiction has been understood as a form of "arising under" federal
question jurisdiction.'z A valid exercise of "arising under" jurisdiction
should require that a case not only raise a potential federal question,2'
but that it also implicate a meaningful federal interest.
This Comment examines how the Supreme Court dealt with the issue
of federal jurisdiction in Red Cross, and explains how analyzing the issue
under a proposed two-part model of protective jurisdiction facilitates a
better understanding of Red Cross' result.'
14. See American Natl Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2467, 2474 (1992).
15. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Jurisdiction is Addressed,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S5 (there are "hundreds of congressionally created
organizations").
16. Title 36 of the United States Code, entitled Patriotic Societies and Observances,
contains the congressional charters of 51 non-government organizations including the
American National Red Cross, 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1988), the Boy Scouts of America, 36
U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1988), and Little League Baseball, Inc., 36 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1088 (1988).
17. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992). Unlike
private corporations, federal corporations are created by an act of Congress. Thus, a
charter amendment requires congressional action through the normal legislative process.
See, eg., Act of May 8, 1947, ch. 50, § 3, 61 Stat. 80, 81 (1947) (Red Cross charter
amendment); Act of August 1, 1947, ch. 440, § 7, 61 Stat. 718, 719 (1947) (amendment to
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation charter).
18. See Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2475-76.
19. See id. at 2476.
20. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
21. See supra note 5.
22. This Comment does not analyze the validity of protective jurisdiction. For judi-
cial criticism of protective jurisdiction, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 470-71 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For a criticism of the use of protec-
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Part I reviews the development of protective jurisdiction in the federal
courts as well as the history of the controversy surrounding Red Cross.
Part II examines the current theories of protective jurisdiction, and pro-
poses a model of protective jurisdiction that would allow the federal gov-
ernment to vest federal courts with jurisdiction over cases in which there
is both a federal ingredient23 and a meaningful federal interest. This
model would simultaneously help elucidate the boundaries of Article III.
Part III shows how an analysis of Red Cross under the proposed model
of protective jurisdiction produces a more understandable rationale for
federal jurisdiction in that case, and a more reasonable precedent against
which to judge the appropriateness of federal jurisdiction in future
controversies.
This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
provided a framework for the constitutional exercise of protective juris-
diction that current models have failed to fully articulate. Under the
proposed model, federal jurisdiction would not require that substantive
federal law govern the disposition of a controversy. The presence of a
federal "ingredient," as the term is used in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,24 would empower Congress to extend federal jurisdiction only
when a federal forum advances a meaningful federal interest.
I. THE RED CROSS AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
CONGRESS' RIGHT TO CONFER FEDERAL JURISDICTION ON
FEDERALLY-CHARTERED CORPORATIONS
A. The Concept of Protective Jurisdiction
Protective jurisdiction is commonly viewed as "protective" from the
point of view of one of the parties to the litigation. From that party's
perspective, the federal courts are a more favorable forum for the case
than state courts. 25 For example, the Red Cross might prefer a federal
tive jurisdiction in the face of state sovereignty concerns, see Note, Over-Protective Juris-
diction?: A State Sovereignty Theory of Federal Questions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1948 (1989)
[hereinafter Over-Protective Jurisdiction?]. This Comment, instead, accepts the premise
that protective jurisdiction may be a constitutional exercise of "arising under" jurisdic-
tion if the requisite federal ingredient is present, see Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), and proposes a two part analysis that attempts to address
the difficult question of when Congress can properly "expand" the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. See supra note 13.
23. See supra note 6.
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
25. An out-of-state litigant would prefer a federal forum, for example, to guard
against possible bias in the state courts of the opponent's home state. See infra note 59
and accompanying text. Federal diversity jurisdiction reflects the belief that a federal
forum diminishes this bias. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
Similarly, state hostility toward federal revenue officers led Congress to provide for
removal of state criminal prosecutions against federal officers when the officers' federally
mandated duties provided the basis for the prosecution. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch.
184, 14 Stat. 98, 171 (1866) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988)); see also
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1879) (allowing removal when a federal revenue
1238 [Vol. 61
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forum because of its convenience for consolidating cases. Specifically, if
the Red Cross defends a large number of cases related to the transmis-
sion of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), it would expend
resources unnecessarily in largely duplicative litigation if those cases
were scattered in various state courts.26 Another, more general, reason
might be the perception that the federal judiciary is superior to many
state judiciaries.27 Protective jurisdiction exploits the advantages of a
federal forum for the benefit of a particular party or class of cases.
Often, the federal government is the party whose interests are being
protected by a congressional conferral of federal jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has traditionally allowed Congress to extend
federal jurisdiction to cases involving important federal interests.28 Red
Cross fits this paradigm. The continued economic viability and growth of
the Red Cross qualifies as an important federal interest because the Red
Cross performs vital functions on behalf of the United States government
at home and abroad.29 It is important, therefore, that Congress protect
officer was indicted for murder for actions taken while seizing an illegal distillery). Fed-
eral courts, presumably, are more likely to credit the federal defense. State courts have a
countervailing interest in enforcing the laws of the state.
26. See, eg., Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases The Policy
Issues, 10 Rev. Litig. 231, 232 (1991) (suggesting that the advantages of aggregation in-
clude "economies of scale, efficiencies through avoidance of duplication, and consistency
of result"); George T. Conway HI, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in
State Courts, 96 Yale LI. 1099, 1099 (1987) (noting that the cost of litigating multistate
claims "often exceeds the sums that are ultimately paid to plaintiffs").
27. There are strong advocates on both sides of the debate over parity between federal
and state judiciaries' enforcement of federal rights. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1115-28 (1977) (asserting the superiority of the federal
judiciary); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329, 331-
38 (1988) (same). But see Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 629-35 (1988) (arguing that state and federal
courts are equally competent).
28. The federal government's interest in the growth of the labor movement, for exam-
ple, led to the development of a body of federal common law to govern collective bargain-
ing agreements that would otherwise be governed by state contract law. See Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (enforcing contracts between em-
ployers and labor organizations under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988)). Similarly, Congress' interest in a uniform system of bankruptcy adjudication
allows a trustee in bankruptcy to bring suit against a non-diverse private party in federal
court. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947) (allowing trustee in bankruptcy to
sue non-diverse adverse claimants in federal court); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934) (same).
29. See Wesley A. Sturges, The Legal Status of the Red Cross, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1957). Professor Sturges contended that the importance of the Red Cross to the United
States' obligations under the Geneva Treaties, see supra note 1, sets it apart from other
membership corporations created by Congress. See Sturges, supra, at 9. As Professor
Sturges noted further, "[tlhe obligations imposed upon the corporation to aid the Gov-
ernment of the United States in the fulfillment of its undertakings under the Geneva
Treaties should, perhaps, be emphasized as the most telling indication of its stature as an
instrumentality of the United States." IA at 14.
In 1905, Congress reincorporated the Red Cross in its present form believing its work
so important as to demand government supervision. See 36 U.S.C. § 1, pmbl. (1988).
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the Red Cross from excessive liability stemming from its role as one of
the major suppliers of blood and blood products in the United States.30
Given the government's reliance on the Red Cross for unique and un-
duplicated services, 31 it is not surprising that Congress would want to
extend to the Red Cross the protection of the federal courts.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States3 2 sparked the idea of protective
jurisdiction.33 Osborn stands for the proposition that a case arises under
federal law if an issue of federal law "forms an ingredient of the original
cause." 34 Commentators sought to explain Osborn with a theory of pro-
tective jurisdiction.
In Osborn, the charter of the Second Bank of the United States con-
tained a clause that authorized the bank to "sue and be sued.., in all
State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any circuit court in
the United States.",35 The Supreme Court held that this language gave
federal courts original jurisdiction over suits involving the Bank because
of the specific reference to the federal circuit courts. 36 The Osborn Court
reasoned that the jurisdictional grant was constitutional under Article III
because all of the Bank's capacities flowed from the act of Congress that
Government supervision includes the President's appointment of eight members of the
Board of Governors. See 36 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1988). Of the eight members, one is desig-
nated the corporation's principal officer, and the remainder are officials of other depart-
ments and agencies of the federal government. See id.
Courts have acknowledged the important services the Red Cross provides to the armed
forces. See Granzow v. United States, 261 F. 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1919) (uttering remarks
intended to shake public confidence in the Red Cross, and thereby reduce contributions
to it, violates the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917)). The
Eighth Circuit recognized the Red Cross as an "auxiliary to the armed forces." Granzow,
261 F. at 173. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Red Cross
is a government instrumentality for the purposes of immunity from state taxation. See
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966). The Court noted
that the Red Cross "perform[s] a wide variety of functions indispensable to the workings
of our Armed Forces around the globe." Id. at 359.
30. The Red Cross supplies "more than one half of the nation's needed blood and
blood products." American Red Cross, 1985 Annual Report 22 (1985).
31. See Sturges, supra note 29, at 17.
32. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
33. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response
to the Burger Court, 71 Va. L. Rev. 343, 370 (1985) ("[t]he starting point is... Osborn v.
Bank of the United States"); Robert T. Novick, Comment, Problems "Arising Under"
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 1039, 1052 (1982) ("Os-
born v. Bank of the United States was the first case in which the Supreme Court con-
strued the 'arising under' language of article III . . . ."); Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 933, 965 (1982) ("Osborn is the
grandfather of the theory of protective jurisdiction.").
34. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
35. Id. at 817.
36. See id. Osborn was an extension of an earlier case in which the Court held that
the lack of a specific reference to the federal courts in a charter creates only a general
capacity to sue. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809),
overruled by Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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created it.3 7 Hence, all suits involving the Bank arose under federal
law.38 The federal charter provided the "original ingredient" necessary
to support Article III "arising under" jurisdiction.39 Red Cross reaf-
firmed Osborn's "original ingredient" test.40
B. Evolution of Protective Jurisdiction in the Courts
The Supreme Court reviews legislation purporting to extend federal
jurisdiction for its conformity with Article III. 4 1 Article III declares that
"[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."42
In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall gave Article III a broad interpreta-
tion,43 holding that a case "arose under" federal law if an issue of federal
law "form[ed] an ingredient of the original cause." 44 Even an ingredient
that is not likely to be litigated is sufficient to support jurisdiction.45
Marshall suggested that federal courts could properly exercise jurisdic-
tion over any case that falls within this constitutional definition of judi-
cial power if Congress chooses to grant such jurisdiction."6
The Court reaffirmed Congress' broad power over federal court juris-
diction in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer.7
Although Tidewater Transfer focused on diversity jurisdiction, the exten-
sion of jurisdiction under the diversity clause is analogous to the Court's
treatment of cases under the "arising under" clause.48 Tidewater Trans-
37. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 824.
40. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2475-76 (1992). Both
Osborn and Red Cross assert that because a corporation is organized under an act of
Congress, every activity of the organization is theoretically governed by federal law-the
law that created the organization-and Congress can, therefore, confer or withhold fed-
eral jurisdiction. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823; Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2475-76.
41. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III, § 2 delineates II types of jurisdiction,
including the "arising under" jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship. See id
42. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
43. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see also
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) ("Osborn thus
reflects a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction .... ").
44. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
45. See iL at 824 (capacity to sue granted by federal charter is unlikely to be chal-
lenged after initial judicial determination); see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The traditional interpreta-
tion ... is that... Congress may confer [jurisdiction] whenever there exists in the
background some federal proposition that might be challenged, despite the remoteness of
the likelihood of actual presentation of such a federal question.").
46. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 818-19.
47. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
48. See idt at 584-85; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("[t]he judicial Power shall




fer exemplifies the extent of Congress' power over federal jurisdiction in
the presence of important federal interests.
The plurality in Tidewater Transfer upheld the constitutionality of a
federal statute providing federal diversity jurisdiction over civil suits be-
tween citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of a state.49 The
statute defined the word "state," for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, to
include the District of Columbia." This enactment directly contradicted
Hepburn v. Ellzey, 1 an earlier Supreme Court decision, which held that
the term "state" did not include the District of Columbia. 2
To avoid overruling Hepburn's53 narrow interpretation of the term
"state", Justice Jackson, in Tidewater Transfer, looked beyond the
bounds of Article III to uphold the constitutionality of the jurisdictional
grant. 4 To find that section 1332 was constitutional, Jackson relied on
Congress' exclusive power, under Article I of the Constitution, 5 to gov-
49. See Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. at 603-04. The Court upheld the Act of April
20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143 (1940) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
(1988)). Section 1332 provides for federal court jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship, and declares that "[t]he word 'States,' as used in this section, includes the Territo-
ries, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d) (1988).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1988).
51. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
52. See id. The Hepburn Court construed the term "state" narrowly in both the Con-
stitution, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, and in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78. See Hepburn, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 452 ("[T]he members of the American
confederacy only are the states contemplated in the [C]onstitution."). Justice Marshall,
however, need not have construed the Judiciary Act as synonymous with the Constitu-
tion. Various terms have been construed broadly in the Constitution, and more narrowly
in a statute, even when they contained virtually identical language. For example, both
Article III, § 2, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 use virtually identical language allowing federal
jurisdiction where there is diversity of citizenship. Compare U.S. Const. art. III, § 2
(federal jurisdiction over cases "between a State and Citizens of another State" and "be-
tween Citizens of different States") with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (federal jurisdiction
for suits "between citizens of different States"). The Supreme Court has determined that
Article III requires only minimal diversity. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ta-
shire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). In contrast, diversity jurisdiction based solely on
§ 1332 requires complete diversity. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71
(1939) (construing the predecessor to § 1332, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36
Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911)).
Marshall could have given the term "state" its broadest meaning in the context of
Article III, and a more narrow interpretation for purposes of § 1332. The result in
Hepburn would have been the same. Unlike the statute at issue in Tidewater Transfer,
the Judiciary Act of 1789 contained no language purporting to include the District of
Columbia within its definition of the term "state." The Hepburn Court could have found,
therefore, that the definition of "state" in Article III is broad enough to include the
District of Columbia, but Congress did not intend to include it for purposes of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789.
53. See Hepburn, 6 U.S. at 452.
54. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1949).
The traditional interpretation of the Constitution was that Article III alone determined
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
55. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Clause 17 provides that "Congress shall have
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em the District of Columbia. 6 Although a plurality of the Court agreed
that Congress' power was broad enough to extend diversity jurisdiction
to citizens of the District of Columbia, 7 a majority of the Court rejected
the premise that federal jurisdiction was not governed by Article III
exclusively.5 8
The federal interest in Tidewater Transfer was, nevertheless, clear.
The extension of diversity jurisdiction to citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia reflected concern for possible bias against one of the parties to a
lawsuit. That same concern led the drafters of the Constitution to open
the federal courts as an alternative, and presumably neutral, forum for
disputes between residents of different states.5 9 The federal ingredient,
however, was not as clear. Congress' Article I power to govern the Dis-
trict of Columbia' could provide the requisite federal ingredient if the
jurisdictional grant is viewed as part of a comprehensive regulatory
framework.61 A challenge to the validity of that framework could, poten-
tially, raise a federal question. Although this federal ingredient, alone,
could support federal jurisdiction,62 it seems likely that the importance of
the federal interests influenced the Court's decision.
Federal interests also figured prominently in the Court's decision to
uphold jurisdiction in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.63 The
Court upheld federal jurisdiction in Lincoln Mills by using the federal
courts' inherent power to fashion federal common law."4
Lincoln Mills involved a collective bargaining agreement that con-
tained an arbitration clause.6" The Textile Workers Union brought suit
the power... [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such Dis-
trict ... as may ... become the Seat of the Government of the United States .. .
56. See Tidewater Transfer, 337 U.S. at 588-89.
57. See id. at 604 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
58. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, rejected this proposition in his con-
currence. See iL at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Jus-
tice Douglas, rejected it in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, entered a separate dissenting
opinion. See id at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Hepburn, although superseded by
statute, has still not been overruled.
59. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases...
between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States .... );
see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Constitution's diversity clause reflects "a belief in the inad-
equacy of state tribunals in determining state law").
60. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
61. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (a grant
of federal jurisdiction over actions involving foreign sovereigns is constitutional if it is
within a broad statutory framework enacted pursuant to Article I powers); infra note 73
and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 6.
63. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
64. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); see also
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("The
[Supreme] Court also has recognized a responsibility, in the absence of legislation, to
fashion federal common law in cases raising issues of uniquely federal concern.
65. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449.
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in federal court to compel the employer to arbitrate a dispute.6 6 Federal
court jurisdiction was based on section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"). 67 Section 301 appears to be a pure
jurisdictional statute providing no substantive law, and as the Court later
held, a pure jurisdictional statute cannot support Article III "arising
under" jurisdiction.6" Anticipating this conflict with Article III, the
Court determined that, along with jurisdiction, Congress intended the
federal courts to fashion a body of federal substantive law to govern cases
brought under the LMRA.69
By fashioning a body of federal common law to govern section 301
suits, the Lincoln Mills Court provided more than simply a federal ingre-
dient. Section 301 suits would be governed by substantive federal law.
Moreover, the federal interests that dictated the Court's decision to fash-
ion this body of federal common law are analogous to those interests that
would support protective jurisdiction. The Court focused on the impor-
tance of the federal policy behind the legislation and expressed concern
that the policy could not be fully effectuated under existing state law.7 0
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' right to
extend federal jurisdiction to controversies between foreign citizens and
foreign sovereigns, even if the law to be applied is the law of another
country.7" Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria72 held that a grant
of federal court jurisdiction that is within a comprehensive regulatory
scheme is permissible under Article III. Congress can, for example, con-
fer jurisdiction over a class of cases in the course of exercising its power
to regulate interstate commerce or some other Article I power.73
This approach differed from that espoused by Justice Jackson in Tide-
66. See id.
67. Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). Section 301
provides as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
68. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1983).
69. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). The Court
did not invalidate the statute although the jurisdictional grant arguably preceded the
federal law supporting its constitutionality.
70. See id. at 456-57. Two important policies were to encourage collective bargaining
ending in enforceable contracts, see id. at 453, and to decrease the likelihood of strikes by
encouraging binding arbitration. See id. at 453-55. The Court was concerned that con-
struing § 301 narrowly as just a jurisdictional statute, "would undercut the Act and de-
feat its policy." Id. at 456. The Court noted that promoting these policies would require
fashioning a federal rule in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements as the common law
rule operated against enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. See id. (citing Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) which discusses the common law rule).
71. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983).
72. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
73. See id. at 496.
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water Transfer74 in that Congress actually provided some substantive
rules of decision. Sovereign immunity was a necessary question of fed-
eral law to be decided in every case.75
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"),76 provided the fed-
eral ingredient in Verlinden necessary to support "arising under" juris-
diction.7 7 Some of the Court's dicta, however, also emphasized the
importance of the federal interest,78 which suggested that something
more than a federal law "ingredient" was required.79
The federal interest implicated in Verlinden involved foreign rela-
tions.8 o Foreign relations decisions such as sovereign immunity are
rarely subject to judicial interference. The Court, therefore, recognized
that Congress should be able to extend federal jurisdiction to facilitate
the resolution of disputes involving foreign states.8
The Supreme Court's most recent look at congressional conferral of
federal jurisdiction actually acknowledged the existence of a theory of
protective jurisdiction predicated on the protection of federal interests.8 2
In Mesa v. California,"3 the Court, however, declined to adopt this the-
ory, refusing to recognize any federal interests that were not already ade-
quately protected." Mesa held that in the case of a state criminal
prosecution, the federal officer removal statute8 5 required the averment
of a federal defense or removal would be improper. 6 The Court deemed
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
75. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
76. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-
(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
77. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493. A suit of the type espoused in Verlinden could
only be sustained if the foreign sovereign was not entitled to immunity under §§ 1605-
1607 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA"), or any applicable interna-
tional agreement. See id at 488-89; see also FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
This federal law issue is relatively minor, and once decided would no longer be a part
of the case. If the sovereign is entitled to sovereign immunity, the case would be dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
Sovereign immunity could not be used as a defense in the case if United States law ap-
plied, and would probably be irrelevant if the case was governed by foreign law. The
federal law issue is, however, "an ingredient of the original cause," as required by Osborn.
See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
78. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493 ("Actions against foreign sovereigns in our courts
raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and the pri-
macy of federal concerns is evident.").
79. The Court stated, for example, that a jurisdictional statute itself cannot be the
federal law under which the action arises. See id at 496. Presumably the Court was
distinguishing between a pure jurisdictional statute and one that also grants capacity to
sue and be sued, as in American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
80. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
81. See id at 493.
82. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
83. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
84. See id. at 137.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988).
86. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 132. Section 1442(a) provides that:
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the federal officer removal statute to be a "pure jurisdictional statute"
which, therefore, could not independently support Article III "arising
under" jurisdiction. 7 According to the Court, the existence of a substan-
tial federal issue, and not the statute itself, determines whether a case is
removable. 8
Arguably, petitioners' federal officer status in Mesa could have pro-
vided the requisite "federal ingredient" to support jurisdiction within the
bounds of Article III.89 The Court, however, concluded that it did not.90
This conclusion indicates that something other than federal law "some-
where in the background" is required to support jurisdiction.9 The
Court's dicta reemphasized the importance of government interests in
determining the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction.92 The Court left
open the possibility that a sufficiently compelling government interest
might alone support "arising under" jurisdiction, even in the absence of a
contested federal issue.93
It is difficult to determine, from the body of protective jurisdiction case
law, how willing the Supreme Court is to allow Congress to "expand"
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.94 The Supreme Court traditionally
has shown great deference to Congress' choice of forum for specific
classes of litigation. It clearly imposes some outer limit, however, which
[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any
of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting
under him, for any act under color of such office ....
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988).
87. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136.
88. See id. ("[I]t is the raising of a federal question ... that constitutes the federal law
under which the action against the federal officer arises for Art. III purposes.").
As in Verlinden, the Court questioned Congress' ability, within the confines of Article
III of the Constitution, to extend federal jurisdiction to cases where no issue of federal
law would be adjudicated. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136. Notably, the Court did not ex-
pressly reject the theory of protective jurisdiction. Rather, the Court stated, "[w]e have,
in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support
Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction, .. . and we do not see any need for doing so here
...." Id. at 137.
89. The petitioners in Mesa urged removal because the traffic accidents for which
they were being prosecuted arose during the performance of their federally mandated
duties. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 123.
90. See id. at 136.
91. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
92. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137.
93. See id. The government urged the Court to adopt a theory of protective jurisdic-
tion as a means of avoiding difficulties with Article III. See id. The government sug-
gested that a "generalized congressional interest in protecting federal officers from state
court interference suffices to support Art. III 'arising under'jurisdiction." Id. The Court
did not foreclose this possibility, but denied the presence of a sufficiently compelling fed-
eral interest. See id.
94. See supra note 13.
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is dictated by Article III of the Constitution." The Court, nevertheless,
seems disinclined to disturb the federal charter cases that appear to rest
solely on the presence of a nascent "federal ingredient."96
Aside from the federal charter cases, more recent judicial emphasis has
been on the presence of meaningful federal interests.97 This recent trend
raises the question of whether the present Court would allow federal ju-
risdiction to be extended to a congressionally chartered corporation
when no federal interests were implicated and no federal law issues
would be litigated.9 Red Cross was not such a case. The government
clearly had a meaningful interest in providing a federal forum for the
Red Cross.9 9
C. Background of Red Cross-An Examination of the Federal
Charter Cases
Since 1987, the Red Cross and its regional subsidiaries have been in-
volved in an increasing number of law suits related to the transmission of
the AIDS virus through infected blood."°° Plaintiffs in these cases gener-
ally file suits in state court claiming negligence, malpractice, or other
state law causes of action.10' The Red Cross sought removal of these
actions to the federal courts. 1°2 It contended that the "sue and be sued"
language in its congressional charter'03 created original jurisdiction in
the federal courts over all suits involving it, thus allowing removal.' °"
The controversy that led to the Supreme Court's decision in Red Cross
started with a split in authority among the federal circuit courts concern-
95. See, eg., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983)(Congress cannot "expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds estab-
lished by the Constitution").
96. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) ("We would
be loathe to repudiate such a longstanding and settled rule.").
97. See e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137-38 (1989) (jurisdiction was not
permitted because all federal interests were protected).
98. Direct precedent for doing so exists. See e.g., Knights of Pythias v. Kalinski, 163
U.S. 289, 290 (1896) (federal jurisdiction supported by congressional charter); Butler v.
National Home for Soldiers, 144 U.S. 64, 66 (1892) (same).
99. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
100. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10-12 nn.4-5, American Nat'l Red Cross v.
S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992) (No. 91-594) (the number of court decisions on this issue
increased from 3 in 1987 to 21 in 1991).
101. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr., 486 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. 1992)(plaintiffs alleging negligence in blood donor screening); Doe v. American Red Cross
Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323, 325 (S.C. 1989) (same).
102. The Red Cross predicated removal on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). The text of
§ 1441(a) provides that:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
103. See supra note 9.
104. See Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d at 764.
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ing whether language in the Red Cross' charter conferred original juris-
diction on the federal courts." 5 In Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center,10 6
the Eighth Circuit reviewed the line of federal charter cases and con-
cluded that the Red Cross charter did confer original jurisdiction on the
federal courts.'0 7
The Eighth Circuit's analysis started with Osborn v. Bank of the
United States.'08 The Supreme Court has interpreted Osborn to allow
federal court jurisdiction over congressionally chartered corporations so
long as Congress has evinced an intent to confer such jurisdiction.° 9 The
Supreme Court addressed the charter issue again in Texas & Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. Kirk (Pacific Railroad Removal Cases).10 In light of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1875,1"1 which established general federal question
jurisdiction, and the holding in Osborn, the Pacific Court determined that
"a suit by or against a corporation of the United States is a suit arising
under the laws of the United States.""' 2 According to the Pacific Court,
the mere fact of incorporation by Congress transforms any dispute in-
volving the corporation into a federal question." 3
The decision in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases greatly expanded
the number of cases eligible for removal to the federal courts based on
statutory federal question jurisdiction.' 14 Congress responded to the in-
creased litigation involving railroads by passing the Act of January 28,
1915,11 which provides that "[n]o court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any railroad company
upon the ground that said railroad company was incorporated under an
Act of Congress. '116
In 1925, Congress enacted a statute that limited federal court jurisdic-
tion over all government corporations in a manner similar to the statute
105. Compare Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr., 938 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding
original jurisdiction) with S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1501 (1st
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992) (finding no jurisdiction).
106. 938 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991).
107. See id. at 93.
108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
109. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Kirk, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (noting that Osborn
settled the jurisdiction issue for congressionally chartered corporations); see also supra
notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing Osborn).
110. 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
111. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
112. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Kirk, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885).
113. See id.
114. See S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1497 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
115. Act of January 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803 (amending the Judiciary Act of
1875).
116. Id. The Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider the effect of the Act of
January 28, 1915, see id., came in Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 241 U.S. 295
(1916). The Court confirmed that the Act did eliminate federal incorporation as an in-
dependent basis for federal question jurisdiction in cases involving railroads. See Bankers
Trust, 241 U.S. at 307.
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covering railroads.n1 7 The current version of the statute provides that
"[t]he district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action by or
against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorporated by or
under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more
than one-half of its capital stock."' 18
After the passage of this jurisdiction limiting statute, it was unclear
whether the Red Cross could continue to rely on the fact of its incorpora-
tion under an act of Congress as a basis for statutory federal question
jurisdiction. 19 The Kaiser court determined that, despite section 1349,
the precedent established by Osborn-that a specific reference to federal
courts in a charter confers original jurisdiction on those courts-had not
been overruled." 0
The Kaiser court's conclusion relied partly on the Supreme Court's
decision in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC. 2 D'Oench, Duhme seemed
to affirm that a specific reference to federal courts in a charter confers
original jurisdiction."2 The case involved a dispute over whether the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") could collect on a de-
mand note that the original parties agreed would not be called for pay-
ment.123 Although the basis of federal court jurisdiction was not at issue
in that case, the Court, nevertheless, mentioned that jurisdiction was
based on a charter that allowed the FDIC to "sue or be sued 'in any
court of law or equity, State or Federal.' '124 The Kaiser court found,
accordingly, that the Red Cross charter grants original federal jurisdic-
tion because it too included the phrase "State or Federal."" 2
In contrast to Kaiser, the First Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of Osborn and its progeny. 26 In S.G. v. American Na-
tional Red Cross, 27 the court rejected the plain meaning of Chief Justice
Marshall's language in Osborn by stating, "We do not believe that Os-
117. See Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 12, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (1925) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988)).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988).
119. The various federal courts that have addressed the issue were unable to agree on
whether the Act applied only to federally chartered business corporations of which the
United States literally owned one half the capital stock, or whether the Act also applied
to nonstock corporations like the Red Cross. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112
S. Ct. 2465, 2469 (1992) ("[Tlhe effect of the 1925 law on nonstock corporations like the
Red Cross is unclear... ."); C.H. v. American Red Cross, 684 F. Supp. 1018, 1020-22
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (detailing the split in authority over whether § 1349 applies to nonstock
corporations).
120. See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr., 938 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1991).
121. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
122. See iL at 455-56.
123. See id at 454, 456.
124. Id. at 455 (emphasis added) (quoting the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 264(j), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 172 (1933)).
125. See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr., 938 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1991).
126. See S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1496 (Ist Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
127. 938 F.2d 1494 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
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born's holding... should be read to confer talismanic significance on a
simple reference to federal courts in a congressional charter."' 128
Although Osborn did not make a distinction, the First Circuit found it
significant that the charter at issue in Osborn referred specifically to the
federal circuit courts,129 rather than to the federal courts in general.'3 0
The First Circuit also discounted the Supreme Court's explanation of
the basis of its jurisdiction in D'Oench, Duhme 131 which referred to the
portion of the FDIC charter that authorized the corporation to sue and
be sued "'in any court of law or equity, State or Federal.' "132 Addi-
tional language in the charter made it clear, in D'Oench, Duhme, that
original federal jurisdiction existed, 133 and thus, the opinion did not ex-
amine the significance of specific words in the charter.
Concluding that the language in the Red Cross charter was not specific
enough to bring it within the ambit of Osborn and subsequent cases,'
34
the First Circuit then examined the congressional history of the amend-
ment that inserted the words "state or federal" in the charter. 135 The
"sue and be sued" clause appears in a section of the charter entitled
"Name of corporation; powers," which, the court reasoned, only "de-
nominates standard corporate powers." 136 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that absent clear intent to the contrary, this clause creates only
the capacity of the corporation to litigate. 137
The S. G. court found no clear intent to confer federal court jurisdic-
tion in the legislative history of the amendment. 138 Upon examination of
other congressional charters that were amended at approximately the
same time as the Red Cross charter, the court concluded that the ambi-
128. Id. at 1497.
129. See supra text accompanying note 35.
130. See S.G., 938 F.2d at 1496-97. The First Circuit also noted the parallel treatment
of the references to state and federal courts in the Red Cross charter. See id. at 1498; see
also supra note 9 (relevant excerpt of Red Cross charter). The court concluded that "[n]o
clear basis exist[ed] for interpreting [the charter] as having expanded the jurisdiction of
federal courts over the Red Cross while merely having conferred on the organization the
power to sue in state courts ... ." S.G., 938 F.2d at 1498.
131. See S.G., 938 F.2d at 1498-99.
132. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455 (1942) (citations omitted).
The FDIC charter actually went on to state the following:
All suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Corporation
shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States and
the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without
regard to the amount in controversy ....
Banking (Federal Reserve) Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 692 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Court noted the more spe-
cific jurisdictional grant in a footnote in the case. See D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 455-
56 n.2.
133. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
134. See S.G., 938 F.2d at 1497.
135. See Act of May 8, 1947, ch. 50, § 3, 61 Stat. 80, 81 (1947).
136. S.G., 938 F.2d at 1499.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1499-1500.
1250 [Vol. 61
THE MISSING "INGREDIENT"
guity of the language in the Red Cross charter, when compared with the
clarity of the language in other charters, evinced an intent not to confer
original jurisdiction. 139
Specifically, the amendment to the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion (the "FCIC") charter provided the most striking example of Con-
gress' ability to clearly confer federal jurisdiction because of its proximity
to the Red Cross charter amendment.'4° The amended FCIC charter
provided that the corporation "may sue and be sued.., in any United
States district court, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such dis-
trict court to determine controversies without regard to the amount in
controversy."' 41 In this instance, Congress clearly intended to confer
original jurisdiction. At the time the Red Cross charter was amended,
Congress was capable of unambiguously conferring federal jurisdiction
whenever it chose. 42 The Court concluded, therefore, that the decision
not to be clear and unambiguous was a conscious one. 4
3
In deciding this controversy, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected
the First Circuit's contention that Osborn was not meant to confer "talis-
manic significance" on a reference to federal courts in a congressional
charter. 1" The majority reasoned that the Court's interpretation of
other federal charters, prior to the Red Cross charter amendment, put
Congress "on prospective notice" that including a specific reference to
federal courts in a congressional charter would be construed as intent to
confer federal jurisdiction. 41
The Court also rejected the First Circuit's analysis of congressional
intent.' 46 It determined that the First Circuit's reliance on Congress'
demonstrated ability to confer jurisdiction in very clear and precise terms
139. See id. The court referred to the congressional charter of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988 & Supp. IH 1991) (as amended by
the Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 684 (1935)). Section 1819 of the FDIC charter states as
follows:
All suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Corporation
shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States and
the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without
regard to the amount in controversy.
Id This specific language showing a clear intent to confer federal jurisdiction was added
twelve years before the Red Cross charter amendment that added the language at issue in
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992). Compare Act of May 8, 1947,
61 Stat. 80 (1947) (Red Cross charter amendment) with The Banking Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 684 (1935) (FDIC charter amendment). The court reasoned that the absence of
such specific language in the Red Cross charter militated against a finding of intent to
confer jurisdiction. See S.G., 938 F.2d at 1499 n.5.
140. See Act of August 1, 1947, ch. 440, 61 Stat. 718, 719 (1947) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 1506(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
141. Id
142. See supra 139-41 and accompanying text.
143. See S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1497-98 (1st Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
144. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2467 (1992).
145. See id at 2469.
146. See id at 2474.
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was misplaced.147 Despite the explicit language in contemporaneous
amendments to other charters, Congress was still on notice of the juris-
dictional significance of the Red Cross charter language. 48
The Red Cross Court also reiterated the importance it placed on the
charter language in D'Oench, Duhme. 149 Although the grounds for juris-
diction were not in dispute in D'Oench, Duhme, the Court noted that
jurisdiction was based on the language in the congressional charter that
allowed the corporation to "sue or be sued 'in any court of law or equity,
State or Federal.' ""Io The Court found it significant that the more spe-
cific jurisdictional provisions were only mentioned in a footnote. 15
The Red Cross Court concluded, from its own analysis of congres-
sional intent, that the 1947 charter amendment was probably intended to
confer federal jurisdiction on the Red Cross. 52 The impetus for the
amendment came, apparently, from a recommendation of an advisory
committee (the Harriman Committee) assembled in 1946 by the Chair-
man of the Red Cross to review the structure and organization of the
corporation.1 53 Recommendation No. 22 of the Harriman Committee
Report advised that "'[t]he Red Cross has in several instances sued in
the Federal Courts, and its powers in this respect have not been ques-
tioned. However, in view of the limited nature of the jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts it seems desirable that this right be clearly stated in the
Charter.' ,154 Congress, thereafter, amended the charter by inserting the
words "State or Federal" after the existing language "sue and be sued in
courts of law and equity."' 155
According to the Red Cross Court, the history of the passage of the
1947 amendment, although not definitively clarifying congressional in-
tent, sheds some light on the purpose of the amendment. 15 6 The legisla-
tive history, as the Court observed, was, at best, neutral. 15 7 To the extent




149. See id. at 2470.
150. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455 (1942). The Red Cross
charter contains this same language. See supra note 9.
151. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2470 (1992).
152. See id. at 2474.
153. See S. Rep. No. 38, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1028-29.
154. The American National Red Cross Report of the Advisory Committee on Organi-
zation at 35-36 (June 11, 1946), quoted in S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d
1494, 1499 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
155. See S. Rep. No. 38, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1028-29 ("The present legislation incorporates, in the main, the recommen-
dations of the advisory committee.").
156. See Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2474.
157. See id.
158. See id. The language of the recommendation, although referring to the limited
nature of federal court jurisdiction and the Red Cross' right in that regard, is by no
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Notably, the Supreme Court did not comment on the validity of the
doctrine of protective jurisdiction in Red Cross. Nor did the Court dis-
cuss whether the extension of federal jurisdiction over a congressionally
chartered corporation was such an exercise. Regrettably, the Supreme
Court has rarely acknowledged the doctrine by name, or discussed the
validity of the theory in any opinion of the Court.15 9
II. CURRENT THEORIES AND USES OF PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION
A. The Development of the Doctrine Through Scholarly Debate
Protective jurisdiction has been the subject of extensive commentary
by legal scholars. 160 Several major theories justifying the exercise of pro-
tective jurisdiction have emerged from this literary debate. Because the
means unambiguous. The First Circuit interpreted this amendment as an attempt to clar-
ify the Red Cross' capacity to litigate in federal court rather than to confer federal subject
matter jurisdiction. See S.G. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1500 (1st Cir.
1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992). As the Supreme Court noted, however, capacity of
the corporation to litigate was never at issue. See Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2475 (It is
"extremely doubtful that capacity to sue simpliciter motivated that amendment").
159. But see Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (disavowing a need to adopt
a theory of protective jurisdiction); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 473-75 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (objecting to the exercise of what he con-
siders protective jurisdiction).
One commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court's reluctance to define more
precisely the boundaries of Article III may be attributed to the textual ambiguity of the
Constitution. See Over-Protective Jurisdiction?, supra note 22, at 1969. The Constitution
does not vest the Court with exclusive authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Rather, Congress is given explicit authority to make exceptions and regulations
governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
and the very existence of the lower federal courts was left to Congress' discretion. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. As Professor Barry Friedman observed, this textual ambiguity
has led to "an interactive process between Congress and the Court on the appropriate
uses and bounds of the federal judicial power." Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1990).
Given the explicit recognition of Congress' role in defining the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the Supreme Court may be more reluctant to attempt to limit congressional ac-
tion. The boundaries of Article III have, therefore, "evolve[d] through a dialogic process
of congressional enactment and judicial response." I. at 2.
160. See Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 866-70 (3d ed. 1988); Martin Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allo-
cation of Judicial Power 59 (2d ed. 1990); Brown, supra note 33, at 367-82; William I.
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 Tul. L Rev.
907 (1988); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and The 'Related To' Bankruptcy Jurisdic-
tion: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, I 1 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1 (1987); Carole
E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
Rev. 542 (1983); John E. Kennedy, Federal Jurisdiction, 19 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 603
(1988); Mishkin, supra note 5; Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article
III Jurisdiction, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 169, 198-206 (1990); Kenneth S. Rosenblatt, Re-
moval of Criminal Prosecutions of Federal Officials: Returning to the Original Intent of
Congress, 29 Santa Clara L. Rev. 21 (1989); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 224-25; Novick,
supra note 33; Rosenberg, supra note 33; Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal
Jurisdiction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 703, 709-11 (1982) [hereinafter Bankruptcy]; Note, Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure-Article III Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 Harv. L Rev.
208 (1983); Over-Protective Jurisdiction?, supra note 22.
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Supreme Court has generally avoided discussing the theory or exploring
its contours,1 61 commentators have attempted to fill the void by offering
possible explanations for the Court's decisions.
Professor Herbert Wechsler advanced one of the first models of protec-
tive jurisdiction. 162 This model would allow Congress to pass a statute
conferring federal jurisdiction even if it chose not to enact substantive
law to govern the controversy. 63 This view considers jurisdiction just
"one mode by which the Congress may assert its regulatory powers."'' 64
Professor Wechsler's model is the broadest of the current formulations
of protective jurisdiction. Wechsler contended that, at minimum, Con-
gress' power to confer jurisdiction "must extend.., to every case that
might involve an issue under federal law."' 65 In addition, Wechsler be-
lieved that Congress' power should extend "beyond this to all cases in
which Congress has authority to make the rule to govern disposition of
the controversy but is content instead to let the states provide the
rule." '166 In sum, Wechsler regarded the jurisdictional statute as the fed-
eral law under which the case arose for Article III purposes. 167
Professor Wechsler's model has been criticized in its applicability to
Osborn as it is not clear that Congress could have enacted substantive
legislation to govern all suits involving the Federal Bank. 6" It is also
unclear whether Congress could enact substantive legislation to govern
all legal relationships with the Red Cross.' 6 9 In addition, the Supreme
Court has clearly refuted Professor Wechsler's contention that a case can
"arise under" a jurisdictional statute for Article III purposes.17
161. But see Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) ("We have, in the past, not
found the need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising
under' jurisdiction .... ."); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471-76
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing protective jurisdiction). For a discussion
of possible reasons for this phenomenon, see supra note 159.
162. See Wechsler, supra note 5, at 224-25.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 225.
165. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 225 ("A case is one 'arising under' federal law within the sense of Arti-
cle III whenever it is comprehended in a valid grant of jurisdiction ....").
168. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); see also Mishkin, supra note 5, at 189 ("(lIt is far from certain even
today that federal law could be made substantively to govern every one of the Bank's
lawsuits.").
169. The American National Red Cross, as the national Red Cross Society for the
United States, must maintain political and economic independence from the federal gov-
ernment in order to qualify for recognition by the International Red Cross. See Sturges,
supra note 29, at 2-3 n.4. Although the Red Cross has been recognized as an instrumen-
tality of the federal government for purposes of immunity from state taxation, see Depart-
ment of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966), a body of substantive
law to regulate the legal relationships of the corporation may violate the principle of
political independence.
170. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983).
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A second model of protective jurisdiction, set forth by Professor Paul
Mishkin, predicates federal jurisdiction on the protection of a congres-
sional program or regulatory scheme. 7 Professor Mishkin's model re-
ceived strong support from Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria."'
The Verlinden Court emphasized the presence of a comprehensive regu-
latory scheme of which the jurisdictional provisions were just one part."v3
Mishkin's model, however, does not go far enough. When applied to
Red Cross, it suffers from some of the same flaws as Professor Wechsler's
model. Specifically, it does not account for the absence of a federal regu-
latory program governing the Red Cross.1 4 Thus, an extension of fed-
eral jurisdiction must be permissible even in the absence of a regulatory
scheme.
A third model of protective jurisdiction would allow Congress to pro-
vide federal jurisdiction in two distinct circumstances: First, if an issue
in the case will be governed by substantive federal law, the jurisdiction is
"substance-based"; 175 and second, when Congress desires to provide a
federal forum for the adjudication of a certain class of disputes and fed-
eral law is not applicable, the jurisdiction is "forum-based." 176 The au-
thor of this model argues that jurisdiction can arise under a pure
jurisdictional statute supported only by forum-based concerns.'"
According to this model, a grant of jurisdiction supported only by fo-
rum-based concerns must meet three specific criteria. 78 First, the juris-
dictional grant must further an Article I interest. 179 Second, the interest
must be substantial.18 Third, the grant must be no broader than the
Article I interest warrants.'
This model comes closest to a comprehensive scheme of protective ju-
risdiction that would allow Congress the flexibility to extend jurisdiction
to a wide variety of cases that implicate meaningful federal interests. It
does not, however, completely accommodate Red Cross. Red Cross met
only two of the author's three criteria. The Red Cross is integral to a
foreign affairs program that involves Congress' powers under Article I of
171. See Mishkin, supra note 5, at 195.
172. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
173. See id at 496.
174. One might argue that because the Red Cross was established as part of the United
States' obligations under the Geneva Treaties, see supra note 1, its creation and grant of
jurisdiction are part of a federal program. The Geneva Treaties, however, do not provide
any substantive or procedural law that could be said to govern tort suits against the Red
Cross. See id
175. See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 948.
176. See id
177. See id. at 951.
178. See id at 958-59.
179. See id at 958.
180. See id at 958-59.
181. See id. at 959.
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the Constitution. l"2 Further, the interest is substantial in that the Red
Cross performs unique services for the federal government at home and
abroad. 83 A grant of jurisdiction over all civil actions involving the Red
Cross, however, is not narrowly tailored to advance the Article I interest
at issue. Rather, the concern for protecting the Red Cross from financial
burdens that could interfere with the effective delivery of disaster relief
services seems to be in response to the unique threat of liability in con-
nection with the AIDS virus. 184
This model also conflicts with other pronouncements of the Supreme
Court. Inasmuch as the author suggests that a case can "arise under" a
pure jurisdictional statute, 8 5 the Supreme Court has rejected that
proposition.18 6
B. A Comprehensive Theory of Protective Jurisdiction
Given Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, and Congress' need
for flexibility in deciding whether to provide substantive federal law or a
federal forum for protection of certain interests, an accurate theory of
protective jurisdiction should recognize that the presence of a meaningful
federal interest is a necessary component of the requisite "original ingre-
dient." This two-part analysis prevents Congress from overburdening
the federal courts with non-federal litigation, as the courts can ultimately
determine whether the case involves a sufficiently meaningful federal
interest.
1. The Federal Ingredient
The Supreme Court has suggested that a federal ingredient is some
underlying issue of federal law that determines, in part, whether the
plaintiff can prevail on the claim.'" 7 Moreover, the issue need not be
contested. 188 The Court, therefore, seems to be employing a de minimis
182. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the Red Cross' importance
to the federal government).
183. See id.
184. Some of the earliest cases in which the Red Cross tried to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the district courts involved the AIDS virus. See, e.g., Anonymous Blood
Recipient v. Sinai Hosp., 692 F. Supp. 730, 731 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (plaintiff allegedly
contracted AIDS from tainted blood); Roche v. American Red Cross, 680 F. Supp. 449,
450 (D. Mass. 1988) (plaintiff alleged her husband died of AIDS from tainted blood).
185. See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 951.
186. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) ("[fjure jurisdictional statutes
which seek 'to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases'
cannot support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction."); see also Verlinden B. V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1983) ("[T]his Court has rejected congressional
attempts to confer jurisdiction on federal courts simply by enacting jurisdictional
statutes.").
187. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823-24 (1824).
188. See id. at 824.
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standard for determining the presence of a federal ingredient 1 9
In Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nigeria,11° the federal ingredient
was very prominent as the court had to determine the presence or ab-
sence of sovereign immunity in every case brought under the FSIA. 19 1
The various sections of the FSIA provided the federal ingredient that
determined whether a suit could be maintained in federal court) 192 Simi-
larly, The Red Cross' charter also provides a federal ingredient, although
not nearly as prominent an ingredient as the statutory scheme in Verlin-
den. Specifically, the charter gives the organization the capacity to sue
and be sued.193 The plaintiff could not sue the corporation without this
grant of capacity, and the charter is actually a federal statute.' 1
Under the Court's de minimis standard, the federal character of the
postal employees in Mesa v. California 19s should also be a cognizable
federal ingredient. Congress clearly intended to make federal officer sta-
tus a prerequisite to removal.196 A federal ingredient, however, although
necessary, does not alone support jurisdiction.1 97
2. Meaningful Federal Interests-A Balancing Test
A meaningful federal interest must also be present to support federal
jurisdiction. For an interest to be meaningful, Congress need not demon-
strate that it intends to regulate the area. An interest in providing uni-
form procedures or a desire that the federal judiciary develop special
expertise in a given area, for example, are meaningful federal interests. 19
A meaningful interest standard is a low threshold. The federal courts,
however, would ultimately determine whether a case falls within the
"arising under" jurisdiction of Article III by deciding whether a particu-
lar federal interest is meaningful. In making this determination, courts
could employ a balancing test: Any discernible interest should be
credited' 99 absent a countervailing interest such as the federalism con-
189. See id. (federal law issue that will be litigated only once is enough to supportjurisdiction).
190. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
191. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
192. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
193. See supra note 9.
194. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1988) (as amended).
195. 481 U.S. 121 (1989).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988).
197. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
198. Other commentators have suggested that the federal interest must be "substan-
tial" or "compelling." See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 958; Over-Protective Jurisdic-
tion?, supra note 22, at 1956. However, increasing the standard for judicial scrutiny
imposes unnecessary barriers to federal jurisdiction; this imposition is contrary to the
constitutional framework which allows Congress great latitude in defining the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts.
199. For an argument in favor of a more narrow federal interest test, see Bankruptcy,
supra note 160, at 710-11.
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cerns expressed in Mesa v. California.2"
The Mesa Court based its rejection of federal jurisdiction on the ab-
sence of a meaningful federal interest.20 1 This result is better explained,
however, as a balancing of the state and federal interests with the Court
favoring the former. The Government argued, and the Court conceded,
that the federal officer removal statutes were enacted " 'to protect federal
officers from interference by hostile state courts.' ,202 The Court con-
cluded that state hostility would more likely be directed "against federal
officers' efforts to carry out their federally mandated duties," rather than
at federal officers per se.203 Rejecting the sufficiency of the asserted fed-
eral interest, the Court determined that there was no need to guarantee
protection in every case with potential for state bias, by allowing removal
of any state criminal prosecution of a federal officer.2" The Court bal-
anced the State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws against the federal
government's interest in protecting federal officers from unlikely state
hostility and resolved the conflict in favor of the State.205
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, °6 state sover-
eignty concerns also weighed against federal jurisdiction. Pennhurst pro-
hibited supplemental jurisdiction20 7 over state claims against state
officials in section 1983 cases.208 Professor George D. Brown raised the
issue of federal jurisdiction over suits against state officials in the context
of advocating the adoption of federal legislation to reverse the result in
Pennhurst.20 9 Professor Brown, relying on Professor Mishkin's model of
protective jurisdiction,21 0 urged Congress to adopt substantive legislation
to reverse the result in Pennhurst and to govern Pennhurst-type cases.21
Professor Brown posited that such a federal statute might be viewed as
200. 489 U.S. 121, 138 (1989) (noting that it is inconsistent with judicial policy "to
permit removal of state criminal prosecutions of federal officers and thereby impose po-
tentially extraordinary burdens on the States when absolutely no federal question is even
at issue in such prosecutions").
201. See id. at 137-38 (1989).
202. Id. at 137 (quoting Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969)).
203. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989).
204. See id. at 137-39 (the federal officer must aver a federal defense).
205. See id. at 137-38.
206. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 11 1990).
208. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). As § 1983 is a federal statute creating a cause of action, suits
brought under it are adjudicated in federal court.
209. See Brown, supra note 33, at 367-82.
210. See Mishkin, supra note 5, at 195-96.
211. See Brown, supra note 33, at 381-82.
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an exercise of protective jurisdiction." 2 He highlighted the federal inter-
est in having federal and constitutional claims adjudicated in federal
court, and the federal policy of imposing a behavioral norm for state
officials that "must supplement or even supercede [sic] existing state pol-
icy,"'213 and concluded that these interests would bolster the validity of a
federal jurisdictional grant.214
Under a balancing test, the courts would decide whether the interests
advanced by Professor Brown outweigh the Eleventh Amendment limita-
tions on federal jurisdiction and the attendant federalism concerns relied
on by the Court in Pennhurst.215 It is difficult to speculate on the prob-
able outcome of such an inquiry.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills21 6 presents an example of a
meaningful federal interest that, under a balancing test, would outweigh
any countervailing state interests. Congress articulated a policy in favor
of enforcing collective bargaining agreements and promoting the use of
arbitration to resolve labor disputes.2 17 The Court was concerned that
denying access to the federal courts, where a body of substantive federal
law could be developed to enforce these contracts, "would undercut the
Act and defeat its policy." '2 1 8 State courts would have had to contend
with a common law rule against enforcement of executory agreements to
arbitrate.2" 9 Federal jurisdiction benefitted the federal program by al-
lowing the development of a federal common law rule favoring enforce-
ability of executory arbitration agreements.' 0 A state's interest in
adjudicating labor disputes under its own contract laws is insubstantial in
the face of the federal policy to promote industrial peace.
Precisely defining a meaningful federal interest would not only prove
difficult, but would be less compatible with the framework of Article III.
The Supreme Court and Congress each have an explicit role in determin-
ing the jurisdiction of the federal courts."' Thus, a comprehensive the-
ory of protective jurisdiction should accommodate the flexibility inherent
in this framework.
212. See id. at 369.
213. Id. at 381.
214. See id.
215. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984).
216. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
217. See id. at 455 (noting that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act "ex-
presses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements").
218. Id. at 456.
219. See id. at 456; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the devel-
opment of federal common law to govern collective bargaining agreements).
220. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
221. See supra note 159.
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III. RED CROSS AS AN EXERCISE OF PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION:
APPLICATION OF THE TWO-PART MODEL OF
PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION
The proposed two-part model of protective jurisdiction offers a better
explanation for the result of American National Red Cross v. S. G.222 than
the formalistic analysis engaged in by the Court. The Court approached
the decision as a mere statutory interpretation case.223 The Court then
relied on Osborn v. Bank of the United States224 to justify the constitu-
tionality of what appears to be a pure jurisdictional statute.225 By refer-
ring to Osborn rather than articulating a doctrine that adequately
addresses the question of Congress' ability to control the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, the Court has missed an opportunity to guide any
future congressional action.
Red Cross would have been particularly well suited as a vehicle for
establishing the doctrine of protective jurisdiction. One important reason
is that the underlying controversy involved no question of federal or con-
stitutional law. 26 Although the Court has long held that a federal char-
ter is a sufficient ingredient for "arising under" jurisdiction,227 it would
have been helpful for the Court to provide guidance for cases where no
federal charter is involved.
As an example of protective jurisdiction, Red Cross suggests that Con-
gress has broad discretion in controlling the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts. There are, however, some limits. At minimum, a case must
contain a federal ingredient. 22 In addition, an important factor in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a grant of federal jurisdiction is the fed-
eral interest involved.229
Federal interests were evident in Red Cross. Specifically, the federal
government relies on the corporation to fulfill several important func-
tions, one of which is the provision of blood and blood products in the
United States. 230 Blood bank liability for the transmission of the AIDS
virus could threaten the financial stability of a charitable organization
222. 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
223. Justice Scalia in dissent criticized the majority for creating a "magic words juris-
prudence." See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
225. See Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2475-76.
226. The plaintiffs in Red Cross originally filed their suit in a New Hampshire state
court charging the Red Cross with common law negligence for failing to screen blood
donors for the AIDS virus. See Respondents' Brief in Opposition at la, American Nat'l
Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992) (No. 91-594).
227. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992); Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
228. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
229. The Supreme Court has only once rejected the extension of federal court jurisdic-
tion when there was arguably a federal ingredient present. See Mesa v. California, 489
U.S. 121 (1989). In Mesa, the Court based its rejection on the lack of a sufficient federal
interest in the type of issue or party involved in that case. See id. at 137-38.
230. See supra note 30.
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like the Red Cross." As Professor Mishkin has pointed out, "the over-
all federal policy thus may... be better protected if all connected litiga-
tion is adjudicated by courts well versed in, and receptive to, the national
policies established. '232 The federal courts may be more cognizant of,
and sympathetic to, the Red Cross' role in foreign affairs.3
The potential for complex litigation that may result from blood bank
liability for transmission of the AIDS virus, and the potential liability
that could be imposed on the Red Cross, weighs in favor of federal juris-
diction for these types of cases. These federal interests would probably
outweigh the states' interests in having tort claims litigated in state court.
The Court's decision in Red Cross left open the possibility that even
the hypothetical slip and fall case from the introduction to this Com-
ment, could properly be adjudicated in federal court. '  The proposed
231. The Red Cross receives very little direct financial support from the federal gov-
eminent aside from the buildings in Washington, D.C., that the congressional charter
makes available for the Red Cross to use as a national headquarters. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 13,
15 (1988). Most of the organization's operating revenues come from public support, cost-
recovery programs, and income from investments including endowment funds. See
American Red Cross, 1985 Annual Report 21-22 (1985).
A verdict against a blood bank for transmission of the AIDS virus was cited in the
National Law Journal as among the highest jury verdicts of 1992. See Margaret C. Fisk,
1992's Largest Verdicts, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at S2, S23. The case marked the first
time a court found the entire blood bank industry negligent in the standards employed for
screening blood donors. See Quintana v. United Blood Servs., No. 86CVI 1750, 1992 WL
438987 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug., 1992), discussed in Fisk, supra, at S2. This case could set
an expensive precedent as liability of the blood supplier would be assumed and all that
plaintiffs would be required to prove is damages.
There have been several large jury verdicts against other blood suppliers related to the
transmission of the AIDS virus. See, eg., Doe v. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr., No.
87CV4127, 1989 WL 389941 (D. Colo. Mar., 1989) ($5,500,000); Edwards v. Blood Sys.,
Inc., No. CV87-35695, 1990 WL 463391 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June, 1990) ($28,700,000);
Katz v. Childrens Hosp., No. C 683 049, 1990 WL 464747 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug., 1990)
($3,000,000); Estate of Savt Eik v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, No. 898-251, 1989 WL
395596 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec., 1989) ($400,000); Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank,
No. 891-642, 1988 WL 373534 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec., 1988) ($750,000); Clark v. United
Blood Servs., No. CV88-6981, 1990 WL 461215 (Nev. Dist. C. Apr., 1990) (S970,000);
Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., No. 88-2-10861-7, 1990 WL 466129 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Oct., 1990) ($1,900,000); Carroll v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 753-411, 1988
WL 373420 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dec., 1988) (S3,935,032).
232. Mishkin, supra note 5, at 195.
233. The presence of a meaningful federal interest in the affairs of the Red Cross is
what distinguishes it from the various other patriotic societies and observances which are
also federally chartered. Title 36 of the U.S.C. is entitled Patriotic Societies and Observ-
ances and contains over 50 congressional charters. The Boy Scouts of America, for ex-
ample, would not satisfy the meaningful interest requirement for protective jurisdiction.
See 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1988). The Boy Scouts function as a private organization and
render no unique services to the federal government. There is no federal interest that
would be apparent to a court in having disputes involving the Boy Scouts adjudicated in
federal court. Congress has shown no desire to extend federal jurisdiction to any of the
federally chartered organizations that make up Title 36 of the U.S.C. The language in
Red Cross that was found to confer jurisdiction is unique to the Red Cross charter. See
36 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
234. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2467 (1992) (the Red
Cross is authorized to remove any suit it is defending).
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balancing test, however, would weigh in favor of a denial of federal juris-
diction in that case. More specifically, the Red Cross has been operating
successfully in spite of these garden variety tort suits, and thus, the argu-
ments in support of federal jurisdiction in the AIDS context are inappo-
site. An express recognition of the importance of federal interests in
determining the propriety of federal jurisdiction would give federal
courts greater control over their own jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally allowed Congress
great latitude in defining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The
Court has acknowledged that there is some outer limit to Congress' abil-
ity to expand federal jurisdiction that is dictated by Article III of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court has been unable or unwilling to
precisely define that outer limit.
In the Court's jurisprudence, however, we find some guiding princi-
ples. There must be some federal ingredient in the case that is a funda-
mental part of a claim or defense even if not litigated. There must also be
a meaningful federal interest in either the parties or the general area of
litigation. This broad framework gives Congress the flexibility to use fed-
eral jurisdiction where the special attributes of federal courts, such as
greater uniformity or perceived neutrality, will help further Congress'
goals. The Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged this special
type of "arising under" jurisdiction. The federal interest requirement
that is the hallmark of protective jurisdiction is the missing ingredient
that would provide a more complete understanding of the "arising
under" jurisdiction of Article III.
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